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ABSTRACT
It has long been recognized that a country's tariffs are the endogenous outcome of a rent-seeking
game whose equilibrium reflects national institutions. Thus, the structure of tariffs across industries
provides insights into how institutions, as reflected in tariff policies, affect long-term growth. We
start with the commonplace perception among politicians that protection of skill-intensive industries
generates a growth-enhancing externality. Modifying the Grossman-Helpman protection for sale
model to allow for this, we make two predictions. First, a country with good institutions will tolerate
high average tariffs provided tariffs are biased towards skill-intensive industries. Second, there need
not  be  any  relationship  between  average  tariffs  and  good  institutions.  Using  data  for  17
manufacturing industries in 59 countries over approximately 25 years, we find that average tariffs
are uncorrelated with output growth and that the skill-bias of tariff structure is positively correlated
with output growth. We interpret this to mean that countries grow faster if they are able and willing
to put a lid on the rent-seeking behaviour of special interest lobby groups.
We show that our results are not compatible with explanations that appeal to (1) externalities per se,
(2) initial industrial structure that is skewed towards skill-intensive industries, or (3) the effects of
broader institutions such as rule of law and control of corruption.
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It has long been recognized that a country’s tariffs are the endogenous outcome of a
rent-seeking game whose equilibrium reﬂects national institutions e.g., Krueger (1974),
Grossman and Helpman (1994) and the review by Gawande and Krishna (2003). Thus, the
structure of tariffs across industries can provide insights into how institutions, as reﬂected
in tariff policies, affect long-term growth. We investigate the relationship between a
country’s domestic institutions and its tariff structure using Grossman and Helpman’s
(1994; 1995; 2001) ‘protection for sale’ model. We then take the theoretical predictions to
the data by estimating the industry level relationship between tariffs and output growth
for a sample of 17 industries in 59 countries over the last 25 years.
Our empirical point of departure is a rich literature on the relationship between av-
erage tariffs and per capita GDP growth e.g., Edwards (1992, 1998), O’Rourke (2000),
Vamvakidis (2002), Yanikkaya (2003), Clemens and Williamson (2004), Jacks (2005) and
DeJong and Ripoll (2006).1 These papers make a number of contributions, highlighting,
for example, how the tariff-growth relationship has changed over time and how it varies
with the level of development. However, there are two very speciﬁc senses in which
these papers are limited in their analysis of the impact of tariffs on growth. First, many
of these papers argue that a positive coefﬁcient on average tariffs should be understood
to mean that there is a positive externality. Yet a key result of Grossman and Helpman’s
(1990; 1991) analysis of tariffs, externalities, and endogenous growth is that what matters
is not just the average tariff, but the structure of tariffs. For example, a country with
high average tariffs will grow rapidly if tariffs are highest in research-intensive industries
and will grow slowly if tariffs are highest in unskilled-intensive industries. It is not the
average tariff alone that matters, but the structure of tariffs. Second, these papers ignore
the endogeneity of tariffs e.g., Treﬂer (1993), Goldberg and Maggi (1999) and Gawande
and Krishna (2005). If institutions determine tariff policies then the tariff coefﬁcient in a
1These are papers that deal explicitly with average tariffs. There are of course many other papers that
deal with openness to international trade more generally.
1growth regression may simply be picking up the familiar correlation between institutions
and growth e.g., La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Schleifer, and Vishny (1997), Hall and Jones
(1999) and Acemoglu, Johnson, and Robinson (2001, 2002). To incorporate tariff structure
and tariff endogeneity into the existing empirical literature, one needs a theoretical model
that allows for multiple industries, externalities that vary across industries, and tariff
endogeneity. This turns out to be possible with just a minor modiﬁcation of the Grossman
and Helpman (1994) protection for sale model. In particular, we introduce externalities
into their model.
The model yields two predictions about institutions and tariffs. In the model, ‘institu-
tions’ are deﬁned narrowly in terms of the game played out between industry lobbyists
and the government. (See Greif (2006) for a tighter deﬁnition of institutions.) In countries
with ‘good institutions,’ policy makers place a heavy weight on both consumer surplus
and future growth while placing little weight on the political contributions of industry
lobby groups. In our model, tariffs affect future growth via externalities and these ex-
ternalities vary across industries. Our ﬁrst prediction is obvious: there need not be any
relationship between good institutions and the average level of tariffs. While consumer
surplus is reduced by high average tariffs, future growth is enhanced by high tariffs in
industries that generate positive externalities.
Our second theoretical result is more subtle and based on two empirical observations.
(1) In almost all countries, unskilled-intensive industries have higher tariffs than skill-
intensive industries. (We show this below for our sample as well.) Countries that heavily
weight consumer surplus will want to reduce price distortions within the tradeables
sector and this requires a reduction in the tariffs of unskilled-intensive industries. (2)
Skill-intensive industries generate positive externalities.2 Thus, countries whose policy
makers heavily weight future growth will want high tariffs in skill-intensive industries.
Putting these two observations together, the ratio of tariffs in skill-intensive industries to
2It is not important here whether this is true or whether it is perceived to be true by policy makers. It is
also not important whether skill-intensive industries generate a positive externality or whether unskilled-
intensive industries generate a negative externality. See Antweiler and Treﬂer (2002) for supporting general
equilibrium evidence of the existence of positive externalities in skill-intense industries.
2tariffs in unskilled-intensive industries will be highest in countries with good institutions.
More succinctly, countries with good institutions will have a ‘skill-biased’ tariff structure.
Summarizing the predictions of our amended protection for sale model, average tariffs
are not informative about whether a country has good institutions. In contrast, the skill-
bias of the tariff structure is indicative of good institutions.
We use these insights to structure an empirical investigation of the impact of tariffs on
long-termindustry outputgrowth. We provideanew paneldatabaseon tariffsandoutput
for 17 manufacturing industries in 59 countries. The panel ends in 2000 and countries
enter as early as 1972. We regress long-term industry output growth on own-industry
tariffsaswellasontwocountryleveltariffmeasures, theaveragetariffandtheskill-biasof
the tariff structure. We ﬁnd that average tariffs are uncorrelated with long-term industry
output growth: countries with lower average tariffs do not grow faster. In contrast, the
skill-bias of the tariff structure is highly signiﬁcant both economically and statistically:
countries with relatively higher tariffs on skill-intensive industries grow faster. These
results also hold in a country level analysis of the impact of tariffs on long-term per capita
GDP growth.
There are several possible interpretations of this result beyond what our model pro-
vides. A large part of this paper is devoted to sorting out these possibilities – which
explains why a formal model is useful – and to discriminating empirically between alter-
native interpretations. There are three groups of alternative interpretations.
The ﬁrst is that we are capturing the broader effects of institutions on growth that have
already been documented by La Porta et al. (1997), Hall and Jones (1999), Acemoglu et al.
(2001, 2002) and others. This is not the case. For one, by including nine regional dummies
we are explaining sample variation within narrowly deﬁned regions. In contrast, other
studies include few or no regional dummies and are largely explaining global sample
variation. For another, we include in a single regression all six World Bank measures of
institutions (Kaufmann, Kraay, and Mastruzzi, 2003). The skill-bias of tariff structure is
more powerful than any one of these institutional measures and is almost as powerful as
3the joint effect of all six. We interpret this to mean that we are capturing the effect of the
narrow lobbying institution described by Grossman and Helpman’s protection for sale
model.
The second alternative interpretation of our results is that we are capturing exter-
nalities alone. Tariffs in skill-intensive industries promote externalities and this in turn
promotes growth. However, unless externalities are much larger than typically estimated,
the pure externalities interpretation requires there to have been a massive expansion of
skill-intensive industries. We ﬁnd no evidence of this. Further, the externalities would
have had to operate at the economy-wide level rather than the industry level and we ﬁnd
no economy-wide effects such as induced human capital accumulation.
The third alternative interpretation is that countries with a skill-biased tariff structure
initially had a large skill-intensive sector. Under this interpretation, all we are ﬁnding is
that initial production structure matters for future growth. However, we control for initial
production structure in all of our speciﬁcations.
In summary, average tariffs are uncorrelated with both industry level output growth
and country level per capita GDP growth. In contrast, the skill-bias of the tariff structure
is an important correlate of long-term growth. We explain this fact using the protec-
tion for sale model modiﬁed to allow for externalities that affect future growth. Rapid
growth occurs in countries whose governments are both willing and able to put a lid on
the rent-seeking behaviour of special interest lobby groups. Sections 2 to 4 lay out the
model. Sections 5 to 7 present the core empirical work.3 The remaining sections examine
alternative explanations of our results and establish robustness.
2. Protection for Sale
We develop a minor modiﬁcation of the Grossman and Helpman (1994) ‘protection for
sale’ model that generates a rich set of predictions relating the ‘quality’ of a country’s
institutions to its cross-industry distribution of tariffs. The minor modiﬁcation is an
3Our core empirical results appear in tables 6 and 7. The impatient reader can jump straight to these.
4inter-sectoral externality. Since almost all of the set-up draws directly from Grossman
and Helpman (1994), we proceed with a terse exposition.4
A representative consumer has separable utility over n + 1 goods. Goods i = 1,...,n
are tradeable while good i = 0 is nontradeable. We take good 0 to be the numeraire.
Let pi be the domestic price of good i and let p = (p1,...,pn) be the vector of domestic
prices. One unit of good 0 output is produced with 1 unit of labor so that the wage rate
is unity. Goods i > 0 are produced under constant returns to scale using labor and a
speciﬁc factor. As a result, output qi depends only on pi. The consumer resides in a small
open economy facing exogenous world prices. Government policies put a percentage gap
τi = (pi − p∗
i )/p∗
i between domestic prices and exogenous world prices p∗
i . We take these
policies to be tariff policies though a more general interpretation is possible. To reduce
notation we set p∗
i = 1 in what follows. The model with p∗
i unrestricted is relegated to the
appendix.
The existence of a speciﬁc factor provides a motive for protection. Owners of the
speciﬁc factor coalesce into a lobby whose welfare is described by Wi(p). Exactly as
in Grossman and Helpman (1994), this captures four sources of beneﬁt: (1) rents that
accrue to the owners of the speciﬁc factor used in industry i, (2) labor income of lobby
members, (3) a share αi of the economy-wide consumer surplus, and (4) a share αi of
the economy-wide tariff revenue. The lobby’s share αi is just the fraction of the voting
population that owns some of the speciﬁc factor of industry i. In return for protection, the
lobby gives the government a political contribution Ci(p). Wi and Ci depend on prices in
all sectors because there is a pecuniary externality: prices in other sectors affect items 3
and 4.
We now introduce our only departure from the Grossman-Helpman set-up. We al-
low for the possibility that a tariff in one sector generates an economy-wide externality.
4See also Grossman and Helpman (1995, 2001), Helpman (1997), Goldberg and Maggi (1999), Gawande
and Bandyopadhyay (2000), Gawande and Krishna (2005) and Mitra, Thomakos, and Uluba¸ so˘ glu (2006). A
number of papers consider extensions of the original ‘protection for sale’ model. Mitra (1999) and Magee
(2002) allow for endogenous lobby formation, Bombardini (2005) allows for ﬁrm heterogeneity and Chang
(2005) allows for monopolistic competition.
5Consider just two examples. First, protection of skill-intensive industries raises the de-
mand for skills, thus leading to human capital accumulation and possibly to faster future
growth. Conversely, protection of unskilled-intensive industries lowers the returns to
human capital accumulation and hence retards growth. Second, skill-intensive industries
tend to be industries with complex production (Levchenko, 2004) and industries requiring
relationship-speciﬁc investments (Nunn, 2005). Because of these features of the produc-
tion process, these industries are subject to opportunistic behaviour. Policies that promote
thegrowthoftheseindustriesraisethedemandforagoodlegalenvironment, thusleading
to growth-enhancing institutional reforms. Along these lines, Acemoglu, Johnson, and
Robinson (2005) argue that the rise of international trade in the Atlantic economies during
the early modern period promoted a demand for institutional reforms that were growth-
enhancing. Puga and Treﬂer (2006) make a related argument in the context of medieval
Venice and then show how rapid growth pushed the political equilibrium towards a more
protectionist regime that ultimately choked off the Venetian economy.
For our empirical work, we do not want to prejudge the externality. Thus, we allow
the externality to be either positive or negative. To model the externality, let G(p) be the
welfare (possibly negative) associated with the externalities generated by price (or tariff)
schedule p. We do not need to place any restrictions on G for the results related to our
empirical work. However, it will simplify the mathematical expressions if we assume that
a tariff in industry i affects the externality only via its affect on net exports xi(pi).5 More
concretely, we replace G(p) with G(x(p)) where x(p) ≡ (x1(p1),...,xn(pn)). Results
without this assumption appear in Appendix A. Further, we can make an independent
contribution to the theoretical protection for sale literature if in addition we assume
separability: G(x(p)) = Σn
i=1Gi(xi(pi)) for arbitrary differentiable functions Gi.
Notice that the externality operates via G, but not via current output, which is denoted
by qi. Thisisnotimportantforourtheoreticalmodel. Wehavechosenthisroutebecausein
the empirical work we separate out factors that affect current output from those that affect
5The Grossman-Helpman assumptions ensure that demand and supply in sector i depend only on pi.
Hence xi depends only on pi.
6future output. Therefore, empirically we tend to think of G as the future welfare stream
that accrues from a tariff-induced, growth-promoting or growth-retarding externality. Of
course, the theoretical interpretation of G is far more general.
Let γiG(p) be the externality-induced welfare stream that accrues to lobby i where
Σn
i=0γi = 1. Then the objective function for lobby i is
Wi(p) + γiG(x(p)) − Ci(p). (1)
A key modeling insight in Grossman and Helpman’s original paper is to write the gov-
ernment’s objective function as aW(p) + C(p) for some constant a > 0 where W(p) ≡
Σn
i=0Wi(p) and C(p) ≡ Σn
i=1Ci(p). a captures the weight the government places on
gross welfare relative to political contributions. We extend their approach by deﬁning
government welfare as
aW(p) + bG(x(p)) + C(p) a,b > 0 (2)
where b captures the weight the government places on welfare from externalities relative
to political contributions.6
Equations (1) and (2) satisfy the Bernheim and Whinston (1986) assumptions. As-
suming differentiability of all functions, our equations thus also satisfy the Grossman-
Helpman assumptions. We can therefore use the wonderfully simple Grossman-Helpman
solution methods. We refer the reader to their paper for additional details, including the
concept of ‘subgame-perfect Nash equilibrium’ that we will be using.
3. Characterization of the Equilibrium Tariff Structure
We turn now to characterizing the equilibrium tariff structure (τ1,...,τn) = (p1 −
1,..., pn − 1). Let Ii be a binary indicator taking on a value of 1 if the industry has an
6 All of our results hold when a = b. However, if one thinks of G as the future welfare stream that
accrues from the policy-induced externality then b may be determined by a different set of factors than a. For
example, there is a well known tendency for governments to overly discount the impact of current decisions
on future outcomes. This phenomenon has been repeatedly documented in the literature on political cycles.
For example, Besley and Case (1995) ﬁnd that lack of electoral accountability due to term limits on U.S. state
governors leads to ﬁscal cycles and slower state growth. This suggests that politicians discount the future
because of uncertainty about re-election. Such considerations do not affect a, but do affect b.
7organized lobby and a value of 0 if the industry is not organized. Let L be the set of
industries that are organized. Let αL ≡ Σi∈Lαi be the share of voters that own a speciﬁc
factor in an organized industry i ∈ L. Let γL ≡ Σi∈Lγi be the share of the externality that
accrues to these voters.
Theorem 1 (Protection for Sale with an Externality) The subgame-perfect Nash equilibrium of













for i > 0 where x0
i ≡ ∂xi/∂pi > 0 and G0
i ≡ ∂G/∂xi.
The proof appears in Appendix A. The ﬁrst term on the right-hand side of equation (3) is
identical to Grossman and Helpman’s core proposition 2 (as expressed in their footnote
10). The second term on the right-hand side of (3) is new. To understand its signiﬁcance,
without loss of generality choose i so that industries are ordered by the G0
i:
G0
1 < ··· < G0
n. (4)
This ordering of industries means that a tariff in industry i + 1 is more growth-enhancing
or less growth-retarding than a tariff in industry i. Growth here refers to a one-time
increase in welfare. With this choice of industry ranking, the second term in equation (3)
is increasing in i. That is, all else equal, equilibrium tariffs are highest in industries where
the impact of tariffs is most growth-enhancing or least growth-retarding. Further, and this
is central to our argument, the more weight the government places on the externality (the
larger is b), the more skewed is the tariff structure towards high-i sectors.
4. Institutions and the Structure of Protection
The Grossman-Helpman game played by the government and n lobbies is part of what
Greif (2006) deﬁnes as an institution. We focus on the parameters a and b, which are the
exogenous pay-off relevant part of Greif’s deﬁnition. For brevity, we refer to a and b as
8a country’s institutions. It is natural to think of a and b as parameterizing the degree
to which national institutions put a lid on rent-seeking behaviour. There is abundant
evidence that measures of the prevalence of rent-seeking, and poor institutions generally,
are negatively correlated with long-term growth. It is therefore appropriate to say that the
larger are a and b, the ‘better’ are institutions.7
We start with a general statement about the effect of institutions on tariffs. Changes in
a and b have two effects. There is a direct effect that operates through equation (3), holding
qi/x0
i and G0
i ﬁxed. This direct effect is trivial to calculate – simply differentiate equation
(3) with respect to a and b. We will sometimes say that the direct effect holds constant the
structure of production. There is also an indirect effect that captures how changes in a and b
lead to changes in τi, which lead to changes qi/x0
i and G0
i, which feed back into additional
changes in τi. This is a far more difﬁcult derivative to calculate. The next theorem deals
with both the direct and indirect effects. The proof appears in Appendix B.
Theorem 2 (Institutions and Tariff Structure) For i = 1,...,n:









for some function φi > 0.










7 Returning to our interpretation of G as the future welfare stream that accrues from a tariff-induced,
growth-promoting or growth-retarding externality, it is useful to think about why b might vary across
countries. Institutions such as the constitution may promote transparency and accountability, thus forcing
the government to be more forward looking. For example, Persson and Tabellini (2003) ﬁnd that countries
with constitutionally mandated strong accountability via the ballot box have reduced levels of both corrup-
tion and government ineffectiveness, have better protection of property rights and, ultimately, have faster
growth. Thus, one interpretation of b is that it is a measure of accountability via the ballot box. Persson and
Tabellini (2003) also ﬁnd that relative to parliamentary regimes, presidential regimes are associated with
signiﬁcantly worse economic performance due to worse structural policies and a legal system that is less
respectful of property rights. Differences in b across countries can thus be due to more subtle cross-country
differences in electoral systems. Overall, we expect b to be highest in countries with political systems that
display transparency and accountability, and are thus able to ﬁnd a better balance between the current
interests of rent-seeking lobbyists and the future welfare of the society.
9This means that better institutions as measured by a larger a, lead to a smaller value of
|τi| i.e., to less of a price distortion.8 9 Better institutions as measured by b lead to more
complex effects on tariffs that we will explain shortly.
Theorem 2 will now be used to draw implications for standard measures of the tariff
structure. In our empirical setting we always control for the structure of production.
Therefore, we work with the direct effect only in what follows.
A. Distortions Between Tradeables and Nontradeables: The Average Tariff
We turn ﬁrst to the textbook inefﬁciency created when a tariff-induced price distortion
leads to a static mis-allocation of resources. We are interested in how lobbying affects the
size of the distortion. Consider ﬁrst the textbook inefﬁciency caused by tariffs that distort
the price of tradeables relative to nontradeables. By assumption, the nontradeable i = 0
sector has a zero tariff. Let us assume for the purposes of empirical work that all tariffs τi
are non-negative. Then the distortion between the price of tradeables and nontradeables
can be modeled as the weighted average tariff
Eτ ≡ Σn
i=1θiτi ≥ 0
where the arbitrary positive weights θi sum to unity.
From theorem 2, ∂Eτ/∂a < 0. That is, good institutions as measured by a lead to
lower tariffs. The same is not true for institutions as measured by b: ∂Eτ/∂b cannot be
signed without additional information about the G0
i. A country with good institutions as
measured by large values of b will tolerate high tariffs in industries that generate positive
externalities.
8To understand φi, let Ω be the Goldberg and Maggi (1999) objective function adopted to our setting
with externalities. Let Ωjj be its second derivative with respect to pj. Then φj(pj) ≡ −Ωjj(pj)/x0
j(pj). The
second order conditions for a maximum (Ωjj < 0) ensure φj > 0. See Appendix B for details.
9An obvious question is about the conditions under which the direct effect is larger than the total effect:
when is φi less than a+ αL? With quadratic utility, quadratic proﬁts and linear externalities, φi = (a+ αL)−
(Ii − αL)q0
i/x0
i. Hence, the total effect of institutions is larger than the direct effect if and only if industry i is
organized (Ii = 1). Further, the bigger is the supply response (q0
i), the smaller is φi. That is, countries with
good institutions put more weight on Ramsey rule considerations.
10This is of interest because researchers who regress per capita GDP growth on aver-
age tariffs often appeal to externalities to explain how higher average tariffs can ‘cause’
higher growth (Edwards, 1992, 1998; O’Rourke, 2000; Vamvakidis, 2002; Yanikkaya, 2003;
Clemens and Williamson, 2004; Jacks, 2005; DeJong and Ripoll, 2006). Our results show
that because of the endogeneity of tariffs, there is no clear theoretical relationship between
growth and average tariffs.
B. Distortions within the Tradeables Sector: The Variance of Tariffs
We have explored price distortions between the tradeable and nontradeable sectors. The
richness of the Grossman-Helpman framework allows us to examine price distortions












i) · db (5)
where the Cov operator means the covariance. See Appendix C for a proof. This implies
that ∂Vτ/∂a < 0 i.e., better institutions as measured by a shrink all tariffs to zero, thus
reducing the price distortion within the tradeables sector.
Consider the sign of ∂Vτ/∂b. Casual empiricism suggests that industries which gen-
erate positive externalities are often organized and successful at getting what they want
from law-makers. Thus, one expects G0
i and (Ii − αL) to be positively correlated. In this
case, we show in Appendix C that Cov(τi,G0
i) > 0. Thus equation (5) implies ∂Vτ/∂b > 0
i.e., better institutions as measured by b lead to greater price distortions within the trade-
able sector. Thus, ∂Vτ/∂a and ∂Vτ/∂b are of opposite sign: better institutions can be
associated with either larger or smaller price distortions within the tradeables sector.
11C. Externalities and the Skill-Bias of Tariff Structure
We next consider the externality bias of the tariff structure. Recall that in equation (4) we
ranked industries by G0
i > G0
i−1. That is, a tariff in industry i is more growth-enhancing or
less growth-retarding than a tariff in industry i−1. An immediate implication of theorem
2 is the following result about the impact of institutions on tariffs holding constant the
structure of production:














It is clear that better institutions as measured by b will lead the government to favour
industries that generate positive externalities or at least that do not generate overly large
negative externalities: ∂(τi − τi−1)/∂b > 0. Interestingly, there are solid empirical reasons
for thinking that ∂(τi − τi−1)/∂a > 0.
As is well known, almost every country in the world has a tariff structure that is biased
towards unskilled-intensive industries e.g., in both rich and poor countries clothing is
protected more heavily than computers. More generally, in the data we will be presenting
on 3-digit ISIC industries in 63 countries, the cross-industry correlation between tariffs
and skill intensity is negative in 52 of 63 countries and signiﬁcantly positive in only 1
country. The interesting insight comes from equating the ordering of industries by G0
i with
the ordering of industries by skill intensity. The connection between skill intensity, human
capital and externalities is a familiar one (e.g., Moretti, 2004). If orderings by externalities
and skill intensities overlap, then we know empirically that τi < τi−1. Hence equation (6)
implies ∂(τi − τi−1)/∂a > 0. As a rises, tariffs fall most in unskilled intensive industries.
Why? Since tariffs are highest in unskilled intensive industries the easiest way to reduce
average tariffs is to reduce tariffs disproportionately on unskilled intensive industries.
Wehavenowestablishedthatbetterinstitutionsasdeﬁnedbyboth a and b areconsistent
with a skill-biased tariff structure. This is the ﬁrst time in our paper that increases in a and
b move tariff structure in the same direction. It suggests that measures of the skill-bias
of protection play a unique role for determining the correlation between growth and the
structure of tariffs. This novel ﬁnding comes out of the protection for sale logic.
12Table 1. Summary of the Relationships Between Domestic Institutions and the Tariff Structure.
Average Variance of skill-bias of
Tariffs: Eτ Tariffs: Vτ Tariffs: SBτ
Price of tradeables Prices within
vs. nontradeables tradeables Externality
Economic Effect:
∂(Growth)/∂(tariff variable) − − +
Political Economy Effect:
∂(tariff variable)/∂a − − +
∂(tariff variable)/∂b ?1 +2 +
Notes: 1 Positive if G0
i > 0 for all i and negative G0
i < 0 for all i. Indeterminate if the sign of G0
i
varies across i. 2 Requires an additional assumption that the covariance between (Ii − αL) and G0
i
is either positive or not too negative.
Table 1 summarizes the results of our theory. The ‘Economic Effect’ row of the table
shows, for each feature of the tariff structure, the predicted economic effect on growth.
Because average tariffs distort the price of tradeables relative to nontradeables, higher
average tariffs reduce growth. (This is a one-time hit to output.) As well, the variance
of tariffs distort prices within tradeables, reducing growth. If there is an externality, the
economic effect of a skill-biased tariff structure is positive because it distorts the allocation
of resources towards industries in a manner that is either more growth enhancing or less
growth retarding.
The ‘Political Economy Effect’ rows show the correlation between tariff structure and
institutions a and b. Only for the skill-bias of the tariff structure does the correlation with a
have the same sign as the correlation with b. In a regression of growth on tariff measures,
these rows give the direction of the endogeneity bias caused by the correlation between
tariff policy and institutions a and b. The table will thus guide the implementation of the
regressions and the interpretation of the coefﬁcients.
135. Estimating Equations and Data
We now introduce our basic regressions. Let qict be the output of industry i in country c
in year t. We consider only long-term growth so that we take t = 0 to be the initial year
(usually 1972) and t = 1 to be the ﬁnal year (usually 2000). Our dependent variable is
the average annual change in log output, denoted lnqic1/qic0.10 Let τic0 be the log tariff in
industry i in country c in the initial year t = 0. Let Eτc0 and Vτc0 be the output-weighted
average tariff and variance of tariffs, respectively, in country c in the initial year 0. Let
SBτc0 be the skill-bias of tariffs in country c in the initial year 0. We will deﬁne it carefully
below. We are interested in the impact of tariffs τic0 on output growth. However, if we are
interested in the full effect of tariffs, then we must recognize that in general equilibrium
tariffsinoneindustryaffectoutputinotherindustries. Therefore, ourindustryregressions
include the national measures of tariff structure Eτc0, Vτc0 and SBτc0. This leads to our
estimating equation:
lnqic1/qic0 = βττic0 + βEEτc0 + βVVτc0 + βSBSBτc0 + βq lnqic0 + Xc0βX + αi + εic. (7)
Following the tradition of the tariffs-and-growth literature, we regress output changes
on tariff levels. See Edwards (1992, 1998), O’Rourke (2000), Vamvakidis (2002), Yanikkaya
(2003), Clemens and Williamson (2004), Jacks (2005) and DeJong and Ripoll (2006). This
strategy is particularly relevant in our context where tariffs are correlated with institutions
a and b that are best viewed as time-invariant country characteristics.
Our results about tariffs and institutions examined ‘direct effects’. In terms of theorem
2, this means holding constant industrial structure qi and x0
i. Assuming that the slope
of the export function is the same for all countries, x0
i is perfectly correlated with our
industry ﬁxed effects αi. That is, we do not need to separately include x0
i in our equation.
This leaves only qi, which appears in our regression as lnqic0. We also control for a large
number of other country-speciﬁc variables Xc0 that will be introduced as used.
10Note that this is an abuse of notation. More precise notation for our dependent variable would be
1
t1−t0 lnqi,c,t1/qi,c,t0 where t0 is the initial year and t1 is the ﬁnal year.
14We are also interested in the relationship between tariff structure and the average
annual growth rate of per capita GDP, lnyc1/yc0, where yct is per capita GDP in country c
in year t.11 This leads to our country level estimating equation:
lnyc1/yc0 = βEEτc0 + βVVτc0 + βSBSBτc0 + Xc0βX + εc. (8)
The sample is determined primarily by the availability of industry level tariff data. The
industry level sample consists of 59 countries and the country level sample includes an
additional 4 countries. The list of countries appears in table 3. To match the SITC-based
tariff datawith ISIC-basedoutput datawe have aggregatedthe dataup toa common setof
17 manufacturing industries. This is described in Appendix D. There are potentially 1,003
(= 59 × 17) industry level observations. However, some of the output data are missing,
leaving us with only 942 industry level observations. Output data are from UNIDO’s
INDSTAT3 2002 production database as described in UNIDO (2003). There are 63 (=
59 + 4) country level observations. Per capita GDP data are from the Penn World Tables
(PWT), Mark 6.1. Tariff data are from Lai and Treﬂer (2002) and UNCTAD (1994). As
noted above, in the regressions we use the log of ad valorem tariffs rather than the ad
valorem tariffs themselves. This is a minor point that is explained in Appendix D.
6. OLS Results for the Mean and Variance of Tariffs
In this section we present results for the growth-tariff nexus excluding the skill-bias of tar-
iffs SBτc0. We make two points. First and foremost, we wish to familiarize the reader with
the type of regressions we are estimating. Second, we show that there is no relationship
between growth and either average tariffs Eτc0 or the variance of tariffs Vτc0. We will, of
course, have to persuade the reader that our regressors are orthogonal to the residuals.
That is, we must deal with endogeneity bias and omitted-variable bias.
Consider table 4. The ﬁrst set of columns deal with the industry-country level regres-
sions of equation (7). The second set of columns deal with the country level regressions of
11Again, more precise notation would be 1
t1−t0 lnyc,t1/yc,t0.
15equation (8). We begin by explaining the many ancillary regressors that comprise Xc0.
Consider ﬁrst the ‘Cohort Fixed Effects.’ The availability of disaggregated tariff data
is different for each country so that we are unable to use the same time period for all
countries. For 21 countries tariffs are available beginning in 1972, for 30 countries tariffs
are available beginning in the 1980-83 period and for 12 countries tariffs are available
beginning in the 1985-87 period. See table 3 for details. To control for the three different
entry periods of these three cohorts, we include cohort ﬁxed effects i.e., three dummy
variables with dummy Dcj equal to 1 if country c entered in cohort j = 1,2,3. (The 1972
cohort dummy is the omitted dummy.) From table 4, these cohort dummies are jointly
insigniﬁcant.12
Consider next the region ﬁxed effects. Ideally, we would like to include country ﬁxed
effects. However, our tariff variables Eτc0 and Vτc0 are country characteristics that would
be annihilated by country ﬁxed effects. Instead, we take the next best approach which
is to include detailed region ﬁxed effects. We deﬁne 10 regions distilled from the PWT
regional classiﬁcation and include 9 region dummies in our regressions. See table 3 for a
list of which countries are in which regions. We are using far more regional dummies than
is typical. This is an important point. It means the sample variation that we are explaining is all
within narrowly deﬁned regions. Thus, for example, we are using tariff structure to explain
growth differences within North Africa/Middle East (Algeria, Egypt, Iran, Morocco, Syria
and Tunisia). We are not using tariff structure to explain why Algeria has grown slower
than the United States.
In addition to these region ﬁxed effects we also include the familiar country charac-
teristics that appear in growth regressions. These are the log of initial per capita GDP,
the log of initial human capital, and the initial investment to GDP ratio. See Appendix
D for data sources. Without the 9 region ﬁxed effects, these three country characteristics
are statistically signiﬁcant. However, once the region ﬁxed effects are included the three
12The data end in 2000. However, in the country level regressions, there are three countries for which per
capita GDP data end in 1996: Singapore, Cyprus and Sierra Leone. A dummy for this 1996 cohort is also
statistically insigniﬁcant.
16country characteristics become statistically insigniﬁcant. Our main point here is that it
will be very hard to ﬁnd a statistically signiﬁcant country characteristic when so many
region ﬁxed effects are included. This, we believe, makes our results for the skill-bias of
tariffs more persuasive.
Finally, we include industry ﬁxed effects. With 17 industries, we include 16 industry
dummies. We also include the log of initial industry output in country c, lnqic0.
We now turn to the tariff results. Consider ﬁrst the own tariff effect captured by the
tariff in industry i in country c, τic0. This can only appear in the industry-country level
regressions. The coefﬁcient is positive and statistically signiﬁcant (βτ = 0.005, t = 2.20).
As expected, higher tariffs in industry i in country c lead to higher output in industry i
in country c. The estimated magnitude is large. For example, a one standard deviation
increase in the own tariff leads to a 1.0% standard deviation increase in average annual
output growth.13
Turning to the tariff structure variables of our theory, average tariffs Eτc0 do not matter
for output growth at the industry-country level (b βE = 0.007, t = 1.82). Neither does the
variance of tariffs Vτc0 (b βV = −0.019, t = 0.53). When regressing industry-country level
variables on country level regressors such as Eτc0, we report t-statistics calculated from
clustered standard errors. The third column in the table shows that the clustered standard
errors are always smaller than the OLS standard errors. For the remainder of this paper,
for country level regressors that appear in the industry-country output regressions we
report t-statistics calculated from clustered standard errors.
One way of measuring whether the effects of Eτc0 and Vτc0 are large is to consider their
overall effect on average annual per capita GDP growth. We do this in the second set of
columns of table 4. Consistent with the industry-country level results, at the country level
the mean and variance of tariffs are statistically insigniﬁcant. They are also economically
small. For example, a one standard deviation fall in the variance of tariffs leads to only a
.0006 standard deviation rise in the growth of per capita GDP.
13See table 2 for the sample statistics used to derive this.
17It is possible that the insigniﬁcance of Eτc0 and Vτc0 results from a high degree of corre-
lation of these two variables with the many country characteristics that are also included
in the regression. This is not the case. Figure 1 shows that there is no relationship between
average tariffs and growth. Figure 1 is a graph of the bivariate plot (i.e., without controls)
of Eτc0 against the average annual growth of per capita GDP.14 Figure 2 shows the partial
regression plot (i.e., with controls) from the regression reported in table 4. No relationship
is apparent in this plot either. Although we do not report them here, the plots for Vτc0 are
similar. These results may seem surprising. However, they are completely consistent with
the recent empirical evidence showing that there is no clear relationship between average
tariffs and subsequent economic growth. Whether or not there is a signiﬁcant relationship
between average tariffs and growth and whether this relationship is positive or negative
dependscriticallyonthecountriesinthesample(DeJongandRipoll,2006)andonthetime
period under consideration (O’Rourke, 2000; Vamvakidis, 2002; Yanikkaya, 2003; Clemens
and Williamson, 2004; Jacks, 2005).
Having established that there is no relationship between average tariffs and growth or
tariff dispersion and growth, we turn our focus to the skill-bias of tariffs.
7. The Skill-Bias of Tariff Structure
We construct our measure of the skill-bias of the tariff structure SBτc0 as follows. Deﬁne
unskilled workers as those with less than 12 years of schooling. All other workers are
deﬁned as skilled. Next, rank industries based on the ratio of skilled workers (Si) to
unskilled workers (Li). Table 5 displays Si/Li for the United States in 1972. Data are
from Antweiler and Treﬂer (2002).
Our ﬁrst measure of the skill-bias of tariff structure is the cross-industry correlation
between skill intensity and initial tariffs:
ρc = Corr{τic0,Si/Li} “The Correlation Measure of the Skill-Bias of Tariff Structure”.
14To prevent the observations from being too compressed in ﬁgure 1 we omit Hong Kong.
18As noted earlier, most of the countries in our sample have a negative value of ρc.
This means that tariffs tend to be high in unskilled-intensive industries and low in skill-
intensive industries. Figure 3 plots ρc against initial per capita GDP in order to give the
reader a sense of the ρc. The two are positively correlated. This is an indication of the
endogeneity around which our theory was built.
Our second measure is constructed as follows. Choose an arbitrary ‘cut-off’ industry
i∗ and deﬁne all industries i with Si/Li less than Si∗/Li∗ as unskilled-intensive and all
remaining industries as skill-intensive. Let τUnskill
c be the initial year, output-weighted
average tariff for unskilled-intensive industries and let τSkill
c be the initial year, output-




c “The Difference Measure of the Skill-Bias of Tariff Structure”.
An important question is whether our results are sensitive to the choice of i∗. As we
show in section 11 below, it does not matter what we choose for i∗ provided it is not
extremelyclosetotheverytoporverybottomoftable5. Fornow, weproceedbyreporting
all results for two choices of i∗. From table 5, there are two values of i for which the ratio
of skilled to unskilled workers jumps up. In the main text we use these jump points to




c be the corresponding difference measures.
Another question is whether our results depend on our deﬁnition of Si/Li or our use of
1972 U.S. data when constructing our skill intensity rankings. We will also report results
usingrankingsbasedonalternativemeasuresofskillintensity. Thesealternativemeasures
use different deﬁnitions of Si/Li and use data from South Africa in 1997 and from Brazil in
1986. Virtually identical results are obtained with the alternative measures so we relegate
these results to section 11. The explanation for this surprising robustness is simple. While
skill intensities vary across time and countries, the relative ranking of industries based
on skill intensity barely varies: leather goods are always very unskilled-intensive and
19professional equipment is always very skill-intensive.15




c . To give the reader a sense of the data and how the SBτc0 measures are
related to the quality of domestic institutions we plot DIFFLow
c against the two most
commonly used measures of a country’s institutions: (1) democracy, measured using the
average democracy score from 1970 to 1994 from the Polity III database and (2) absence
of corruption in government index, measured as the average from 1982 to 1995 from the
International Country Risk Guide (ICRG) published by the Political Risk Services Group
(PRS). The absence of corruption measure captures the extent to which high government
ofﬁcials are likely to demand and accept bribes connected with special privileges such
as import and export licenses, tax breaks, loans, etc. We show the bivariate relationship
between the two variables and DIFFLow
c in ﬁgures 4 and 5. Similar pictures are obtained
if one uses ρc and DIFF
High
c . The correlation coefﬁcient between DIFFLow
c and democracy
is 0.60 and the correlation between DIFFLow
c and corruption is 0.61. In contrast, the
correlation between DIFFLow
c and per capita GDP growth is only 0.33. Thus, consistent
with our protection for sale framework, SBτc0 is highly correlated with measures of the
quality of domestic institutions (recall table 1).
A. Estimates of the Impact of Skill-Biased Tariff Structure
Table 6 reports our OLS estimates of the industry-country level output growth regressions
(equation 7) with measures of the skill-bias of tariffs included. Table 7 reports the corre-
sponding estimates of the country level per capita GDP growth regressions (equation 8).
These are the core empirical tables of the paper.
15Note that politicians in rich and poor countries will in general disagree as to which industries should be
protected i.e., as to which industry has the largest G0
i. For example, protecting clothing may make sense
in Mauritius whereas protecting aircraft may make sense in the United States. See Harberger’s (1998)
mushrooms model. This is an interesting point which shows up in some of our results. In particular, for
poor countries the model does best for relatively small i∗ whereas for rich countries the model tends to do
relatively best for high i∗. In addition, the best-ﬁt i∗ tends to be lower using the South African and Brazilian
skill-intensity rankings than using the U.S. skill-intensity rankings. We do not pursue this interesting point
further.
20Column 1 of tables 6 and 7 report the results using ρc as our measure of the skill-bias
of the tariff structure. Recall that with so many controls we have not yet found a single
country level variable that is statistically signiﬁcant. In contrast, the coefﬁcient for ρc is
signiﬁcant. The t-statistic is 4.23 in the industry output growth regression and 3.66 in
the per capita GDP growth regression. The magnitude of the coefﬁcient is very large, a
fact that we will detail at the end of this section. Further, the contribution to the R2 is
enormous. Adding just ρc to the country level per capita GDP growth regression raises the R2
from 0.60 to 0.69. The idea that a single regressor could have such a huge effect in a speciﬁcation
that already has 16 regressors is remarkable.
Column 3 of tables 6 and 7 replace ρc with DIFFLow
c as our measure of the skill-bias of
the tariff structure. The results are again statistically signiﬁcant with a t-statistic of 3.46 in
the industry output growth regression and 3.51 in the per capita GDP growth regression.
In the latter, DIFFLow
c raises the R2 from 0.60 to 0.70. Column 7 uses DIFF
High
c as our
measure. The results are even a little stronger than for DIFFLow
c , with the R2 rising to 0.71.





c separately. We do this for the low cut-off in column 5. As
expected, the coefﬁcient on τSkill
c is positive and signiﬁcant: t = 4.16 in the industry
output growth regression and t = 3.66 in the per capita GDP growth regression. Also
as expected, the coefﬁcient on τUnskill
c is negative and signiﬁcant: t = 2.99 in the industry
output growth regression and t = 3.40 in the per capita GDP growth regression.
To check that the results are not being driven by outliers, ﬁgures 6 and 7 display partial
regression plots for the per capita GDP growth regressions. Figure 6 shows the partial
regression plot using ρc (column 1 of table 7). Figure 7 shows the partial regression plot
using DIFFLow
c (column 3 of table 7). From the plots it is clear that the relationships are
not being driven by a small number of inﬂuential observations. In section 11 below we
provide a battery of regression diagnostics aimed at showing that the results are robust to
a variety of speciﬁcation searches.
We have shown that the coefﬁcient on the skill-bias of the tariff structure is statistically
21signiﬁcant. It is also economically signiﬁcant. In the industry output growth regressions, a
one standard deviation increase in ρc, DIFFLow
c or DIFF
High
c is associated with an increase
in average annual industry output growth of 0.018, 0.020 and 0.025 log points. These
are moderately large numbers both in absolute terms and relative to the 0.073 standard
deviation of log output growth. Note that these are effects that are over and above the
own-industry effect of τic0.
8. Interpretation of the Results for the skill-bias of Tariff Structure
We now turn to the interpretation of these results in a world in which tariffs are set
endogenously in a way that leaves the skill-bias of tariff structure positively correlated
with domestic institutions. It is useful to collect the possible interpretations of our results
into three groups.
1. Real Effects of Tariffs (from economic and technological externalities): In terms of our
model, recall that G may be thought of as the future welfare stream that accrues from a
tariff-induced, growth-promoting or growth-retarding externality. This externality may
come from either economic or technological sources. Protection of industries with rela-
tively large G0
i creates a positive externality or at least reduces a negative externality. It
is possible that our coefﬁcients on the skill-bias of tariff structure are picking up these
economic and technological effects.
2. Protection for Sale Effects: In terms of our model, we proved that there is a positive
correlation between the skill-bias of the tariff structure and the narrow institutions of
tariff rent-seeking captured by the a and b parameters. While countries may not be
able to prevent all tariff rent-seeking, some countries are better able to put a lid on the
worst abuses of tariff rent-seeking, abuses that protect unskilled-intensive industries at
the expense of the skill-intensive industries which generate economic and technological
externalities. The problem for us is that higher values of a and b likely make it easier
for countries to adopt other purely domestic policies that are also good for growth e.g.,
policies that are more forward-looking and transparent as in Besley and Case (1995) or
22Persson and Tabellini (2003). Thus, there is an independent channel through which a and
b may affect growth.16
3. Broader Effects of Institutions: Countries that can put a lid on lobbying are likely
to have a host of other institutions that are favourable to long-term growth such as a
strong democratic tradition and a high quality judicial system. Denote this broader set
of institutions as a vector INSTc where larger values of INSTc are associated with more
growth enhancing institutions. In general, we expect elements of INSTc to be positively
correlated with SBτc0, a and b. If so, then our coefﬁcient on the skill-bias of tariff structure
may be picking up the effects of broader institutions on growth.
It is useful characterize the three interpretations of our results formally. Consider a
relationship of the form
lnyc1/yc0 = βSBτc0 + εc (9)
where β captures the economic effects generated by the skill-bias of the tariff structure
(point 1 above). The protection for sale effect (point 2 above) can be thought of as a rela-
tionship of the form ∂(lnyc1/yc0)/∂ac = δ > 0.17 The broader effects of institutions (point
3 above) can be thought of as ∂(lnyc1/yc0)/∂INSTc = γ > 0. In terms of econometrics,
this means that SBτc0 will be correlated with a residual which, assuming linearity, takes
the following form
εc = δac + γINSTc + νc. (10)
where νc is a residual that is uncorrelated with ac, INSTc and SBτc.
Our protection for sale model yields equation (6) which states that the larger is ac, the
larger is SBτc0. Inverting this relationship yields
ac = θSBτc0 (11)
for some θ > 0. Plugging equations (10) and (11) into equation (9) yields
lnyc1/yc0 = (β + δθ)SBτc0 + γINSTc + νc.
16See footnotes 6 and 7 above.
17Note that we have placed a country subscript on a and that we are suppressing b because our comments
about a apply symmetrically to b.
23Thus, we face two econometric problems.
1. Since INSTc is likely correlated with SBτc0, our estimate of (β + δθ) suffers from
omitted-variable bias.
2. We have not disentangled the economic effects (β) from the protection for sale effects
(θ > 0) that generate other forward-looking, growth-promoting policies (δ > 0).
In the next section we deal with the ﬁrst of these problems. We then turn to the second
problem.
9. An Unsupportable Alternative Interpretation: The Role of Broader
Institutions
A standard way of dealing with the problem of endogeneity in equations of the type that
we are estimating is to instrument the endogenous variable SBτc0 with an exogenous vari-
able such as settler mortality (Acemoglu et al., 2001) or legal origins (La Porta et al., 1997).
However, such a strategy exacerbates our problem of estimating β + δθ. By projecting
SBτc0 onto the determinants of broader institutions INSTc we are essentially using the
ﬁtted SBτc0 to estimate γ rather than β + δθ. This is the wrong strategy. In our situation,
instrumental variables requires a variable that is correlated with tariffs, but uncorrelated
with either tariff rent-seeking institutions ac or broader institutions INSTc. While one can
think of potential instruments, such as initial industrial structure, this will not do because
a valid instrument must, in addition to being correlated with tariff structure, have no
direct effect on growth. Industrial structure likely has a direct effect via various forms of
path dependence e.g., learning-by-doing. In short, identiﬁcation of a valid instrument is
very difﬁcult.
A more sensible strategy is what we call ‘saturation’. Speciﬁcally, we add into our
estimating equation a very large number of non-collinear institutional regressors INSTc.
If the span of these regressors is large, then we can reasonably claim to have spanned
24the set of institutions that have broader effects on long-term growth. This eliminates the
omitted variable bias.
To implement our saturation strategy, we include in our estimating equations the full
set of World Bank measures of governance and the quality institutions as reported in
Kaufmann et al. (2003). These measures have the advantage of being comprehensive
in coverage and being highly correlated with the long-term growth of per capita GDP.
They have also proved popular with scholars of institutions e.g., Easterly and Levine
(2003). There are six measures in the World Bank database. (1) Voice and Accountability
measures the extent to which citizens of a country are able to participate in the selection
of governments. (2) Political Stability and Absence of Violence measures perceptions of the
likelihood that the government in power will be destabilized or overthrown by possibly
unconstitutional and/or violent means, including domestic violence and terrorism. (3)
Government Effectiveness measures the quality of public service provision, the quality of
bureaucracy, the competence of civil servants, the independence of the civil service from
political pressures, and the credibility of the government’s commitment to policies. (4)
Regulatory Quality measures the incidence of market-unfriendly policies such as price
controls or inadequate bank supervision, as well as perceptions of the burdens imposed
by excessive regulation in areas such as foreign trade and business development. (5)
Rule of Law measures the extent to which agents have conﬁdence in and abide by the
rules of society. This includes perceptions of the incidence of crime, the effectiveness and
predictability of the judiciary, and the enforceability of contracts. Rule of law is a measure
of the success of a society in developing an environment in which fair and predictable
rules form the basis for economic and social interactions, and importantly, the extent to
which property rights are protected. (6) Control of Corruption measures the perceptions of
corruption conventionally deﬁned as the exercise of public power for private gain. For
our purposes, the key feature of these six measures is that their broad scope provides us
some assurance that we are going a long way towards saturating the institutions space.
One never sees papers in which many measures of institutions are included together
25as regressors in a single regression. The reason is obvious – measures of institutions
are sufﬁciently correlated that if more than a few are included in a single regression,
one cannot precisely estimate the individual coefﬁcients. Restated, one never sees our
saturationstrategybecauseofmulticollinearity. Asweshallsee, whilewecannotprecisely
estimate the six coefﬁcients on INSTc – nor is this what we care about – we can precisely
estimate the coefﬁcient on SBτc0.
Table 6 shows the results of including all six measures into our industry output growth
regressions. Consider the results using our correlation measure of the skill-bias of the
tariff structure ρc. When all six measures of INSTc are included in the regression, the
coefﬁcient on ρc shrinks towards zero as expected (from 0.067 to 0.064), but the t-statistic
does not change at all (t = 4.23). The same result holds for all ﬁve speciﬁcations in table
6, although the shrinkage towards zero is usually larger. For example, the coefﬁcient on
DIFFLow
c shrinks from 0.032 to 0.024, but again the t-statistic barely changes (from t = 3.46
to t = 3.35). Not surprisingly, very few of the six World Bank measures of institutions are
individually signiﬁcant. They are, of course, jointly signiﬁcant as can be seen from the
large increase in the R2 that occurs when all six measures are added in. The individual
insigniﬁcance is indicative of a familiar multicollinearity problem. Similar conclusions
hold when we include important determinants of institutions such as settler mortality
from Acemoglu et al. (2001) and legal origins from La Porta et al. (1997). Our measures of
SBτc0 are always statistically signiﬁcant.
Table 7 provides the analogous results for the per capita GDP growth regressions.
While the statistical signiﬁcance is marginal, it is notable that the t-statistics for our SBτc0
variables are all large relative to any of the six measures of institutions. Also notable is
the fact that the coefﬁcients on the SBτc0 variables shrink by only about a third. Thus,
they remain economically very large. Further, a standard variance decomposition shows
that even if all the correlation between, say DIFFLow
c and INSTc is attributed to INSTc,
DIFFLow
c still contributes 5% to the R2. By way of comparison, if all the correlation
between DIFFLow
c and INSTc is attributed to DIFFLow
c , then DIFFLow
c contributes 10%
26to the R2 and the six variables in INSTc jointly contribute 8% to the R2. Similar results
hold for ρc and DIFF
High
c .
We believe it to be an important fact that our measures of the skill-bias of the tariff
structure survive in a speciﬁcation involving a large number of institutional measures (as
well as 9 regional ﬁxed effects and various additional country characteristics).
A. Institutions, Policies, and Administrative Data
There are likely two reasons why our measures of SBτc0 provide signiﬁcant explanatory
power beyond that provided by the World Bank measures of institutions. First, the tariff
data are precisely measured. This is because they are based on administrative records
that countries must accurately report to the GATT/WTO as part of international treaty
obligations. Accuracy is ensured by the fact that export-oriented businesses lodge com-
plaints when there is a discrepancy between the administrative records submitted to the
GATT/WTO and the customs duties collected locally. Thus, our tariff data are measured
precisely. Second, there is a precise interpretation of our measures of SBτc0: the larger
is SBτc0, the higher are tariffs on skill-intensive industries relative to unskilled-intensive
industries. SBτc0 is the outcome of a clearly articulated policy. In contrast, the concept
of institutions is much more diffuse, making measurement of institutional concepts nec-
essarily difﬁcult. For example, what is political instability? Is it a decades-old military
insurrection that kills thousands, a velvet revolution that deposes a communist regime
without a shot being ﬁred, or a fragmented democracy whose minority governments are
forced to the polls almost every year? The very concept of an institution is so complex
that it deﬁes the sort of comprehensive and objective measurement that is associated with
tariff policies.18 The result is that we have been able to precisely estimate the coefﬁcient
on SBτc0 even when many measures of institutions were included in our regressions.
18Note that we are implicitly emphasizing the difference between institutions and policies.
27B. An Unsupportable Alternative Political Economy Interpretation
One ﬁnal political economy explanation of our SBτc0 result is what Jones (1988) refers to
as the luck of the right elites. A country with a powerful elite in a skill-intensive industry
may be pressured by the elite to provide infrastructure that is favourable to the industry
e.g., public education, protection of intellectual property and a legal environment that
supports the use of complex contracts. A country with a tariff structure that is biased
towards skill-intensive industries may be a country that is lucky enough to have pow-
erful elites in skill-intensive industries. This effect operates via industrial structure. Let
qSkill
c0 ≡ Σi>i∗qic0 and qUnskill
c0 ≡ Σi≤i∗qic0 be the output of the skill- and unskilled-intensive
industries in the initial period.19 If our coefﬁcient on SBτc0 is capturing Jones’ luck of
the right elites, then the coefﬁcient on SBτc0 should go to zero when qSkill
c0 and qUnskill
c0 are
included in our regressions. This is not the case. These variables are already included in
our reported speciﬁcations. See tables 6 and 7.
To conclude, there is little evidence that our results are capturing the broader effects of
institutions.
10. Unsupportable Alternative Interpretations: Externalities and the
Real Effects of a Skill-Biased Tariff Structure
In section 8 we showed that our positive coefﬁcient on SBτc0 could be driven by three
effects: (1) real effects of tariffs β; (2) protection for sale effects δθ; and, (3) omitted variable
bias associated with the broader effects of institutions γ. In the previous section we ruled
out the third effect. In this section we provide four reasons for ruling out the ﬁrst effect.
A. The Large SBτc0 Effect Over and Above Large Own-Industry Effects
The estimated coefﬁcients on SBτc0 are very large even after holding constant institutions.
Consider column 2 of table 6 where the coefﬁcient on ρc is 0.064. A one standard deviation
19Recall that i∗ is the cut-off that appears in table 5. There are two cut-offs: ‘low’ and ‘high’.
28increase in ρc leads to a 1.9% increase in average annual industry output growth.20 For
DIFFLow
c of column 4 and DIFF
High
c of column 8 the increase in average annual industry
output growth is 1.3% and 1.7%, respectively. These are large numbers. More importantly,
they must be added to the already large own-industry effects of tariffs i.e., added to the
effect of the τic0 regressor. A one standard deviation increase in τic0 raises the average
annual growth of industry output by between 0.8% and 1.0%, depending on the speciﬁ-
cation. Thus, imagine a one standard deviation increase in the tariff of a skill-intensive
industry, an increase that happens to raise ρc by one standard deviation. (This is possible
within our sample range.) Then the industry’s output would rise by 3.6% a year, which
is the sum of the above 1.9% effect of ρc and a 1.7% effect due to the own-industry effect.
(For the latter, see column 2 of table 6.) A 3.6% annual increase in output over roughly
25 years is a huge effect. Finally, we must add to this the fact that all other industries
will grow by 1.9% a year faster because the effect of ρc is felt on all industries. Thus, it is
unlikely that we are capturing the real effects of tariffs.
Turning to the per capita GDP growth equations, a one standard deviation increase in
ρc raises per capita GDP growth by 0.6%. For DIFFLow
c and DIFF
High
c the increases are
0.7% and 0.8%, respectively. These are such large effects in per capita GDP growth rates
that it is hard to understand what purely economic process could account for them.
B. The Missing Output Effects
Second, if the large effects on growth rates were due to purely economic effects then we
should expect the sequence of economic effects to begin with increases in the output of
skill-intensive industries relative to unskilled-intensive industries. Let qSkill
ct ≡ Σi>i∗qict
and qUnskill
ct ≡ Σi≤i∗qict with t = 0,1 be the output of the skill- and unskilled-intensive
industries in the initial and ﬁnal periods. Let ∆lnqSkill
c and ∆lnqUnskill
c be the corre-
sponding average annual changes over the two periods. If the coefﬁcients on our SBτc0
variables reﬂected purely economic processes then including ∆lnqSkill
c − ∆lnqUnskill
c in
20From table 2, a one standard deviation increase is 0.29. 1.9% comes from 0.064× 0.29 = 0.019.
29our regressions should dramatically shrink the coefﬁcients on SBτc0. This is because the
proximate effect of a rise in SBτc0 should be a rise in ∆lnqSkill
c −∆lnqUnskill
c . The expected
coefﬁcient shrinking does not happen in either the industry output regressions or the per
capita GDP growth regressions. The coefﬁcients on the SBτc0 are unchanged and the
coefﬁcients on ∆lnqSkill
c − ∆lnqUnskill
c are statistically insigniﬁcant. Thus, whatever the
channel through which SBτc0 operates, it is not through changes in industrial structure.
It follows that the coefﬁcient on SBτc0 likely captures much more than purely economic
effects. This is not to say that there are no changes in industrial structure associated with
tariffs, but that these effects are being captured by τic0.
C. The Missing Human Capital Effects
Third, the coefﬁcients on SBτc0 capture inter-industry effects because the own-industry
effects are already controlled for by τic0. The most obvious inter-industry (pecuniary)
externality is that protection of skill-intensive industries raises the demand for education
which then leads to human capital accumulation and an associated human capital exter-
nality. However, we ﬁnd no evidence of this causal mechanism. A cross-country regres-
sion of human capital accumulation on SBτc0 yields a statistically insigniﬁcant effect.
D. Capital Intensity and Inter-Industry Linkages
Fourth, it is possible that our results stem from the fact that skill intensity is partially corre-
lated with other variables such as capital intensity or the extent of inter-industry linkages
(thelatterinturnproxyingforthepossibilityofexternalitiesorotherrealchannels). Inthis
case the coefﬁcient on SBτc0 suffers from omitted variable bias. This theoretical possibility
has no empirical basis. For example, let Ki/Li be the capital intensity of an industry
as reported in Antweiler and Treﬂer (2002). Let ρK/L
c be the cross-industry correlation
between capital intensity and a country’s tariffs. That is, ρK/L
c is the capital intensity
counterpart to ρc. When ρK/L
c is used in place of ρc, the coefﬁcient is economically and
statistically insigniﬁcant. In the output regression (column 2 of table 6 with ρc replaced
30by ρK/L
c ) the coefﬁcient is −0.009 (t = −0.37) and in the per capita GDP regression the
coefﬁcient is 0.014 (t = 1.12). Similarly insigniﬁcant results obtain when ρc is redeﬁned to
capture inter-industry linkages.
To conclude, we have offered four arguments for why our coefﬁcients on SBτc0 do
not capture the real economic effects of a skill-biased tariff structure. (1) The effect
of a skill-biased tariff structure is too large to be an externality, especially given that
the effect is over and above own-industry tariff effects. (2) The effect holds even after
controlling for shifts in industrial structure towards skill-intensive industries. (3) There
is no economy-wide effect via human capital accumulation. (4) There is no comparable
effect for the capital-bias of tariff structure or for a tariff structure that is biased towards
industries that have large inter-industry linkages (in an input-output sense). (5) The effect
is over and above any effects operating via initial industry structure. Thus, by process of
elimination there does not appear to be an explanation of our result in terms of the real
effects of economic or technological externalities. In the previous section we also ruled
out explanations associated with the broader effects of institutions. We conclude from this
that the coefﬁcient on the skill-bias of the tariff structure captures a country’s willingness
and ability to put a lid on the rent-seeking behaviour of special interest lobby groups.
11. Robustness and Sensitivity Analysis
We now show that the results reported in section 7 are robust. We ﬁrst show that the
results are robust to our deﬁnition of skilled and unskilled industries. We then show that
the results are robust to the measure of skill intensity used. Finally, we show that our
reported results are not being driven by a small number of inﬂuential observations.
A. Choice of Cut-off i∗
To construct DIFFc = τSkill
c − τUnskill
c we had to deﬁne a cut-off i∗ such that all industries
above i∗ in table 5 were classiﬁed as skill-intensive and all industries below or equal to
31i∗ were classiﬁed as unskilled-intensive. We now experiment with i∗. In order to avoid
results that are driven by just a few industries, we require 3 < i∗ < 14. Columns 1 and 4
of table 8 report the coefﬁcient on DIFFc for different choices of cut-off i∗. For example,
in the ﬁrst row (i∗ = 4) only four industries are classiﬁed as unskilled, and in the last
row (i∗ = 13) only four industries are classiﬁed as skilled.21 In the results reported above,
the low cut-off was deﬁned as i∗ = 6 and the high cut-off was deﬁned as i∗ = 12. These
cut-offs appear in bold and correspond to columns 3 (low cut-off) and 7 (high cut-off) of
tables 6 and 7. The conclusion from the results reported in columns 1 and 4 of table 8 is
that the results are not sensitive to the choice of cut-off.
B. Using Alternative Skill Intensity Measures
An important question is whether our results change if we rank industries based on the
skill intensities of a developing country. Table 8 also shows what happens when we rank
industries using skill intensity data from South Africa in 1997 and Brazil in 1986. Data
are from Alleyne and Subramanian (2001) and Shikher (2004).22 The results for different
cut-offs i∗ appear in columns 2, 3, 5 and 6 of table 8. The results show that for cut-offs
that do not include a small number of industries in either the skilled or unskilled category,
the results using either Brazilian or South African skill intensities are very similar to the
results using U.S. skill intensities. Thus, our results are not sensitive to our use of U.S.
data to construct skill intensities.
C. Inﬂuential Observations
Figures 6 and 7 showed that our results are unlikely to be driven by inﬂuential observa-
tions. To investigate further, we re-estimated equations (7) and (8) after omitting inﬂuen-
tial observations i.e., observations with studentized residuals greater than 2.0, 1.8, 1.5 and
1.0. This is a ‘destructive regression diagnostic’ suggested by Belsley, Kuh, and Welsch
21See table 5 for industry descriptions.
22Using the 1972 U.S. data, we have also checked that our results do not depend on our deﬁnition of
skilled and unskilled workers. We ﬁnd that alternative deﬁnitions yield similar results.
32(1980). The results of omitting inﬂuential observations are reported in table 9. The ﬁrst
panel reports the baseline estimates for comparison. The second panel reports the results
after omitting inﬂuential observations. As is apparent, in both the industry-country and
country level regressions, each of the measures of the skill-bias of tariffs remains statisti-
cally signiﬁcant.
12. Conclusions
A common approach to examining the relationship between tariffs and long-term growth
involves regressing per capita GDP growth on average tariffs. A positive tariff coefﬁcient
is typically viewed as evidence of an externality. We made two arguments for looking
beyond average tariffs to the structure of tariffs across industries. For one, high average
tariffs may be less important than whether tariffs are high in industries that generate posi-
tive externalities. For another, tariffs are endogenous and countries with good institutions
maytoleratehighaveragetariffsprovidedthattheyareinindustriesthatgeneratepositive
externalities. To make these points clearly we introduced externalities into the protection
for sale model. The model predicts that there need not be any relationship between good
institutions and either the average tariff or the variance of tariffs. In contrast, the model
predicts that good institutions will be associated with a skill-biased tariff structure.
Guided by these predictions, we examined the determinants of industry output growth
and per capita GDP growth. We found that the average tariff and the variance of tariffs
are indeed uncorrelated with long-term growth. Further, there is a positive relationship
between long-term growth and the skill-bias of the tariff structure. These empirical facts
are exactly as predicted by the model.
We then examined three alternative interpretations of our empirical facts. The ﬁrst
is that the facts mirror the broader effects of institutions on growth that have already
been documented by La Porta et al. (1997), Hall and Jones (1999), Acemoglu et al. (2001,
2002) and others. This is not the case. For one, we included a far more extensive set of
controls than is typical in the institutions-and-growth literature. These controls included
33nine regional dummies, which means that we exploited sample variation within narrowly
deﬁned regions. Thus, for example, we used tariff structure to explain growth differences
between countries within Western Africa. We did not use tariff structure to explain growth
differences between Western Africa and Western Europe. We also included in a single
regression all six World Bank measures of institutions (Kaufmann et al., 2003). These
measures capture the broader effects of institutions such as rule of law and control of
corruption. Not only did our skill-bias-of-tariffs variable survive inclusion of these World
Bank measures, but the skill-bias of tariffs was at least as powerful as each World Bank
measure. Indeed, in our per capita GDP growth regressions, the skill-bias of the tariff
structure contributed 10 percentage points to the R2, an amount not much less than the
joint contribution of all six World Bank measures. Thus, our results differ from what is
currently available in the institutions-and-growth literature. We interpreted this to mean
that we are capturing the effect of the narrow and possibly legal lobbying institutions
described by the protection for sale model.
The second alternative interpretation of our ﬁndings is that our skill-bias of tariff struc-
ture captures externalities. Tariffs in skill-intensive industries promote externalities and
this in turn promotes growth. This may indeed be correct, but it does not explain our ﬁnd-
ings. In our industry level regressions we included both the skill-bias of tariff structure
(a country level variable) and the industry level tariff. We found that the latter was very
important. This means that own-industry tariffs promote own-industry growth and, in
particular, tariffs in skill-intensive industries promote the growth of skill-intensive indus-
tries. However, over and above this substantial own-industry effect, a skill-biased tariff
structurehasahugeimpactonoutputgrowthinallindustries. Suchalargeeconomy-wide
externality would require a massive expansion of skill-intensive industries. We found no
such expansion. Further, such a large economy-wide externality would require a massive
induced effect on economy-wide aggregates such as human capital that are associated
with externalities. We found no evidence of this.
The third alternative interpretation of our ﬁndings is that countries with a skill-biased
34tariff structure initially had a large skill-intensive sector. Under this interpretation, all
we found is that initial production structure matters for long-term growth. However, we
controlled extensively for initial production structure in all of our speciﬁcations.
In summary, we found only a single interpretation of our results that cannot be ruled
out: Countries grow faster if they are willing and able to put a lid on the (possibly legal)
rent-seeking behaviour of special interest lobby groups.
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Appendix A. Proof of Theorem 1
Let equation (GHn) be a shorthand for denoting equation (n) in Grossman and Helpman
(1994). Let yj(pj) be output in industry j. In the text we worked with G(x(p)). Here we
droptheassumptionthat p operatesontheexternalityonlyviaexports x(p) andintroduce
a more general function e G(p) that does not impose the assumption. Then e G(p) replaces
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= −a(pj − p∗
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∂pjW(p) + b ∂
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e G(p) = 0. Thus, from equations
(A 1), (A 2) and the deﬁnition of τj (i.e., τjp∗
j = (pj − p∗
j )) we have
Ωj(p;a,b) = (Ij − αL)qj(pj) − αLτjp∗
j x0
j(pj) + γL e G0
j(p) − aτjp∗
j x0
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No re-impose the assumption e G(p) = G(p0,x1(p1),... xn(pn)). Then e G0
j ≡ ∂ e G/∂pj =
(∂G/∂xj)(∂xj/∂pj) = G0
jx0
j. This together with p∗
j = 1 yields theorem 1.
Appendix B. Theorem 1 with Changing Industrial Structure








aW(p) + b e G(p)
i
.
Deﬁne Ωj ≡ ∂Ω/∂pj, Ωji ≡ ∂2Ω/∂pj∂pi, Ωja ≡ ∂2Ω/∂pj∂a, and Ωjb ≡ ∂2Ω/∂pj∂b.
The ﬁrst-order condition deﬁning the optimal price is Ωj(pj(a,b);a,b) = 0. From the
discussion preceding equation (A 3), Ωj has already been deﬁned in equation (A 3).
Assume that G(x(p)) is separable in x. Then G0
j depends only on xj(pj). It follows that
Ωj is independent of pi for i 6= j i.e., Ωji = 0 for i 6= j. The second-order conditions
thus reduce to Ωjj < 0 for all j. Using this information to differentiate the ﬁrst order
condition Ωj(pj(a,b);a,b) = 0 of equation (A 3) yields Ωjj · ∂pj/∂a + Ωja = 0 or ∂pj/∂a =
−Ωja/Ωjj = τjp∗
j x0
j/Ωjj. Noting that τjp∗
j = (pj − p∗








where φj(pj) ≡ −Ωjj(pj)/x0
j(pj) > 0.











39Appendix C. Proof of Equation (5)



















































































i} ≥ 0 implies Cov(τi,G0
i) > 0.
Appendix D. Data: Description and Sources
The annual average growth of real per capita GDP lnyc1/yc0 is calculated as the average
annual log change in real per capita GDP. The measure of real per capita GDP used is
‘rgdpch’ from PWT 6.1. The initial period of the measured growth varies by country and
is reported in Table 3. For all countries, except for Cyprus, Sierra Leone and Singapore,
the end period is 2000. Because of the unavailability of the Penn World Tables income
data for these three countries, the ﬁnal year is 1996. The uniﬁcation of East Germany and
West Germany in 1990 is handled as follows. The PWT 6.1 provide data for East Germany,
West Germany and uniﬁed Germany for 1991. Using the data from 1991 and 1992, the
income series for West Germany and uniﬁed Germany can be spliced by scaling uniﬁed
Germany’s measures down so that it matches the measures for West Germany during the
overlapping years.
40Log initial output lnqic0 and the average annual log change in output lnqic1/qic0 are
from UNIDO’s INDSTAT3 2002 production database. We convert the output data from
the original 3-digit ISIC classiﬁcation to our industry classiﬁcation, which is described in
table 8.23
The log of initial tariffs τic0 is from Lai and Treﬂer (2002) and UNCTAD (1994). Eτc0







j=1qjc0. For all countries we use 1972 production data from Antweiler and
Treﬂer (2002) as weights. It does not matter whether we use production-weighted or
unweighted average tariffs, but the former makes more sense. As well, it also does not
matterwhetherweusetariffsorthelogoftariffs. Weusethelatterbecauseasmallnumber
of countries, notably Bangladesh and India, have tariffs in some industries that are well
above 100%. Taking logs reduces the inﬂuence of these rates. Vτc0 is the production-
weighted variance of tariffs: Σn
i=1θic0(τic0 − Eτc0)2.
Skill intensity Si/Li is the ratio of workers with 12 years of schooling or more to those
with less than 12 years of schooling in industries in the United States in 1972. Antweiler
and Treﬂer (2002) scale the measure so that the skill intensity in the electricity industry
is unity. For robustness checks, we use two additional measures of skill intensity across
industries. The ﬁrst is the ratio of skilled labor to unskilled labor across South African
manufacturing industries in 1997 from Alleyne and Subramanian (2001). The second is
a measure of average human capital across Brazilian manufacturing industries in 1986
from Shikher (2004). The log of initial skilled and unskilled average tariffs, τSkill
c , τUnskill
c
are constructed by aggregating the industry level tariff data to form skilled and unskilled
average tariff rates. Each country’s industry output in 1972 is used as weights. Three
countries, Haiti, Guinea and Sierra Leone, are not in Antweiler and Treﬂer’s database. For
Haiti, the Dominican Republic’s production weights are used when aggregating tariffs.
23The concordance used is as follows: Industry 241=ISIC 323; Industry 243=ISIC 331; Industry 245=ISIC
321+322; Industry 247=ISIC 332; Industry 150=ISIC 372; Industry 246=ISIC 361+362+369; Industry 220=ISIC
371; Industry 248=ISIC 324+356; Industry 244=ISIC 341; Industry 231=ISIC 382; Industry 242=ISIC 355;
Industry 233=ISIC 384; Industry 140=ISIC 353+354; Industry 232=ISIC 383; Industry 211=ISIC 352; Industry
213=ISIC 351; Industry 249=ISIC 385.
41For Guinea and Sierra Leone, we use Senegal’s production weights. The log of initial
skilled and unskilled production (qSkill
c0 and qUnskill
c0 ) were constructed by aggregating the
industry level production data to form skilled and unskilled total production. In country
level regressions, production data are unavailable for Guinea so we use Senegal’s produc-
tion data for Guinea when constructing initial skilled and unskilled production measures.
Data are from UNIDO’s INDSTAT3 2002 production database.
The initial investment-to-GDP ratio invc0 is gross investment (private plus public) di-
vided by GDP, measured in 1985 international prices, from PWT 6.1. The log of initial
human capital hkc0 is the ratio of workers that completed more than 12 years of education
to those that completed less than 12 years of education. Data are from Barro and Lee (1993)
with minor updates by Antweiler and Treﬂer (2002). Because human capital data are
unavailable for Haiti, Dominican Republic and Guinea, we use human capital measures
from countries with similar education levels. For Haiti we use the Dominican Republic
and for Guinea and Sierra Leone we use Senegal. Haiti and Guinea are in the country
level regressions, but are not in the industry level regressions.
The set of six institution variables are from Kaufmann et al. (2003). Each is a measure
of the quality of the institution in 1998. Each of the six measures is an index ranging from
−2.5 to 2.5, with a higher number indicating a “better” institution.
42Table 2. Summary Statistics.
Industry-Country Country
Regressions Regressions
Mean Std Dev Mean Std dev
Dependent Variables
Output Growth: ln(qic1/qic0) .013 .073
GDP Growth: ln(yc1/yc0) .018 .019
Tariff Structure
Average Tariffs: Eτc0 −1.90 1.47 −1.84 1.43
Variance of Tariffs: Vτc0 .028 .046 .028 .046
Industry-Country Characteristics
Initial Industry Tariff: τic0 −2.33 2.03
Initial Industry Output: ln(qic0) 19.84 2.55
Country Characteristics
Initial Income: ln(yc0) 8.51 .99 8.38 1.03
Initial Investment: invc0 2.88 .56 2.79 .65
Initial Human Capital: hkc0 −2.16 1.23 −2.34 1.23
Skill-Bias of Tariff Structure
Skill-tariff correlation: ρc0 −.27 .30 −.29 .29
Low Cut-off:
Skilled Tariff: τSkill
c0 −2.11 1.35 −2.09 1.32
Unskilled Tariff: τUnskill
c0 −1.74 1.64 −1.67 1.60
Tariff Differential: DIFFc0 −.37 .55 −.42 .55
Initial Output, Skilled Sector: ln(qSkill
c0 ) 22.74 2.30 22.56 2.44
Initial Output, Unskilled Sector: ln(qUnskill
c0 ) 22.10 2.02 21.95 2.14
High Cut-off:
Skilled Tariff: τSkill
c0 −2.39 1.30 −2.36 1.29
Unskilled Tariff: τUnskill
c0 −1.79 1.52 −1.72 1.49
Tariff Differential: DIFFc0 −.60 .58 −.64 .59
Initial Output, Skilled Sector: ln(qSkill
c0 ) 22.02 2.17 21.86 2.30
Initial Output, Unskilled Sector: ln(qUnskill
c0 ) 22.79 2.21 22.62 2.34
Notes: There are 942 observations in the industry-country level output growth regressions
and 63 observations in the country level GDP growth regressions.Table 3. Countries in the Industry-Country Regressions and Country Regressions. Grouped by
Geographic Region.
N. Africa & Middle East West Africa South East Asia Eastern Europe
Algeria (1985-2000) Cote d’Ivoire (1980-2000) Indonesia (1980-2000) Cyprus (1983-2000)2
Egypt (1981-2000) Ghana (1982-2000) Malaysia (1981-2000) Turkey (1987-2000)
Iran (1980-2000) Guinea (1980-2000)1 Singapore (1983-2000)2
Morocco (1982-2000) Nigeria (1982-2000) Thailand (1981-2000)
Syria (1982-2000) Sierra Leone (1982-2000)2 Western Europe & Offshoots
Tunisia (1982-2000)
South West Asia Austria (1972-2000)
Latin America & Carib. Belgium (1972-2000)
South Central Africa Bangladesh (1983-2000) Denmark (1972-2000)
Argentina (1987-2000) India (1972-2000) Finland (1972-2000)
Burundi (1980-2000) Bolivia (1986-2000) Sri Lanka (1983-2000) France (1972-2000)
Malawi (1985-2000) Brazil (1986-2000) Nepal (1983-2000) Germany (1972-2000)
Zimbabwe (1983-2000) Chile (1987-2000) Pakistan (1982-2000) Greece (1972-2000)
Colombia (1986-2000) Ireland (1972-2000)
Ecuador (1986-2000) Italy (1972-2000)
East Africa Haiti (1982-2000)1 East Asia Netherlands (1972-2000)
Mexico (1983-2000) Norway (1972-2000)
Ethiopia (1981-2000) Paraguay (1980-2000)1 China (1982-2000) Portugal (1972-2000)
Kenya (1982-2000) Venezuela (1987-2000) Hong Kong (1985-2000) Spain (1972-2000)
Madagascar (1986-2000)1 Japan (1972-2000) Sweden (1972-2000)
Mauritius (1981-2000) Korea, Rep. (1987-2000) United Kingdom (1972-2000)




Notes: 1 The country is not in the industry-country output growth regressions. 2 The end period is 1996 in the
country level per capita GDP growth regressions.Table 4. Results for Average Tariffs Eτc0 and the Variance of Tariffs Vτc0.
Industry-Country Regressions Country Regressions
Dep. Var.: ln(q ic1/q ic0) Dep. Var.: ln(y c1/y c0)
β Clustered t OLS t β OLS t
Tariff Structure
Average Tariffs: Eτc0 .007 1.82 2.45 .001 .50
Variance of Tariffs: Vτc0 -.019 .53 .54 -.014 .45
Industry-Country Characteristics
Initial Industry Tariff: τic0 .005 2.20 2.96
Initial Industry Output: ln(q ic0) -.010 5.06 8.41
Country Characteristics
Initial Income: ln(y c0) .015 1.16 2.49 -.001 .18
Initial Investment: inv c0 -.019 1.53 3.09 .001 .12
Initial Human Capital: hk c0 -.002 .28 .53 .002 .58
Region Fixed Effects
West Africa -.173 6.44 7.45 -.065 3.04
East Africa -.110 4.57 4.82 -.049 2.37
South Central Africa -.127 4.98 5.26 -.055 2.49
North Africa, Middle East -.080 2.92 3.85 -.042 2.14
Eastern Europe -.045 1.07 1.99 -.022 1.03
Latin America -.036 1.37 1.76 -.037 1.93
East Asia .026 3.24 1.65 .001 .10
South East Asia .024 1.15 1.12 -.017 .86
South West Asia .042 2.21 1.96 -.029 1.46
Cohort Fixed Effects
1980-1983 .270 1.28 1.35 .037 2.00
1985-1987 -.010 .35 .50 .025 1.36





Notes: The industry-country regressions are estimates of equation (7). The dependent variable is the
average annual growth in output of industry i in country c. The country regressions are estimates of




.34Table 5. Skill Intensity: Choosing Cut-Offs for Skilled and Unskilled Categories.
Industry Skill %4
Code Description Intensity in Skill
241 Leather & travel goods .079
62%
243 Wood products .128
3%




150 Non-ferrous metals .184
9%
246 Non-metallic mineral prod. .201
−− − − − − −− Low Cut-Off − − − − −− −− 32%




244 Paper products .397
4%
231 Non-electric machinery .414
12%
242 Rubber products .462
.8%
233 Transport equipment .466
−− − − − − −− High Cut-Off − − − − −− −− 32%
140 Mineral fuels .593
4%
232 Electric machinery .617
16%
211 Medicaments, toiletry & perf. .718
2%
213 Manufactured fertilizers .731
9%
249 Professional equipment .797Table 6. Industry-Country Output Growth Regressions. Dependent Variable is lnqic1/qic0.
Correlation
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
Skill Bias of Tariff Structure
Skill Tariff Correlation: ρc .067 .064
(4.23) (4.23)
Tariff Differential: DIFF c .032 .024 .043 .029
(3.46) (3.35) (4.04) (4.42)
Skilled Tariff: τ
Skill .038 .030 .045 .030
(4.18) (4.26) (4.16) (4.54)
Unskilled Tariff: τ
Unskill -.029 -.019 -.034 -.017
(2.99) (2.65) (3.08) (2.58)
Other Tariff Structure
Average Tariffs: Eτc0 .012 .017 .008 .011 .011 .014
(3.29) (4.92) (2.17) (3.36) (3.49) (4.12)
Variance of Tariffs: Vτc0 -.005 -.038 .004 -.024 .010 -.016 .058 .011 .059 .012
(0.15) (1.02) (0.12) (0.54) (0.26) (0.36) (1.69) (0.29) (1.72) (0.30)
Industry-Country Characteristics
Initial Industry Tariff: τic0 .006 .005 .006 .005 .006 .005 .005 .004 .005 .005
(3.11) (2.83) (3.33) (3.12) (3.08) (3.01) (2.59) (2.55) (2.68) (2.65)
Initial Industry Output: ln(q ic0) -.010 -.010 -.018 -.017 -.018 -.017 -.019 -.018 -.019 -.018
(7.86) (8.23) (8.21) (8.05) (8.22) (8.05) (8.71) (8.36) (8.72) (8.38)
Initial Production Structure
Skilled-Sector Output: ln(q
Skill) -.006 .005 -.006 .005 .010 .012 .009 .011
(1.03) (0.79) (1.04) (0.79) (1.17) (1.91) (1.09) (1.78)
Unskilled-Sector Output: ln(q
Unskill) .022 .007 .022 .007 .001 -.001 .002 -.001
(3.35) (0.89) (3.38) (0.89) (0.14) (0.21) (0.21) (0.08)
Institutions
Voice and Accountability -.023 -.006 -.006 -.009 -.008
(1.98) (0.51) (0.56) (0.94) (0.85)
Political Stability .032 .025 .025 .021 .021
(3.63) (2.50) (2.50) (2.32) (2.31)
Government Effectiveness -.009 -.011 -.010 -.012 -.012
(0.82) (0.90) (0.84) (0.94) (0.93)
Regulatory Quality .030 .028 .027 .029 .028
(4.34) (3.58) (3.50) (3.52) (3.40)
Rule of Law .014 .013 .013 .015 .015
(0.85) (0.72) (0.72) (0.85) (0.86)
Control of Corruption -.036 -.030 -.030 -.027 -.027
(2.27) (2.05) (2.02) (2.11) (2.08)
3 Country Characteristics Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
9 Region Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
2 Cohort Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
16 Industry Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
R
2 .36 .42 .38 .42 .38 .43 .39 .43 .39 .43
Low Cut-Off High Cut-Off
Notes:
b. Appendix table 9 gives the sample period for each country.  
a. The regressions are estimates of equation (7). The dependent variable is the average annual log change of output in industry i in country c. There are
17 industries (roughly 3-digit ISIC) and 59 countries.  There are 942 observations. 
c. For all country level variables, clustered t-statistics are reported.
d. The `3 Country Characteristics' are initial year per capita GDP, initial year investment-to-GDP ratio, and initial year human capital stock. 
e. Regional fixed effects are the 9 regions that appear in table 2. Cohort fixed effects are dummies for countries entering in 1980-83 and 1985-87. Industry
fixed effects are the 16 industry dummies.Table 7. Country Level Per Capita GDP Growth Regressions. Dependent Variable is lnyc1/yc0.
Correlation
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
Skill Bias of Tariff Structure
Skill Tariff Correlation: ρc .033 .020
(3.66) (2.18)
Tariff Differential: DIFF c .018 .012 .019 .014
(3.51) (2.36) (4.03) (2.77)
Skilled Tariff: τ
Skill .019 .013 .020 .014
(3.66) (2.48) (4.05) (2.80)
Unskilled Tariff: τ
Unskill -.017 -.011 -.017 -.012
(3.40) (2.28) (3.62) (2.50)
Other Tariff Structure
Average Tariffs: Eτc0 .003 .002 .003 .002 .003 .002
(1.80) (1.24) (1.46) (0.89) (1.66) (1.15)
Variance of Tariffs: Vτc0 -.014 -.006 .003 .006 .004 .006 .025 .022 .025 .022
(0.49) (0.20) (0.09) (0.20) (0.13) (0.20) (0.85) (0.74) (0.85) (0.73)
Initial Production Structure
Skilled-Sector Output: ln(q
Skill) -.003 -.002 -.003 -.002 .001 .001 .001 .001
(1.06) (0.58) (1.07) (0.61) (0.37) (0.37) (0.33) (0.34)
Unskilled-Sector Output: ln(q
Unskill) .004 .003 .004 .003 -.002 -.002 -.002 -.001
(1.09) (0.76) (1.10) (0.78) (0.64) (0.43) (0.59) (0.40)
Institutions
Voice and Accountability .010 .012 .012 .011 .011
(1.78) (2.05) (1.99) (1.81) (1.82)
Political Stability -.002 -.004 -.004 -.005 -.005
(0.40) (0.85) (0.82) (1.08) (1.07)
Government Effectiveness .002 .003 .003 .003 .003
(0.30) (0.43) (0.44) (0.50) (0.50)
Regulatory Quality .000 .001 .001 .001 .001
(0.03) (0.17) (0.16) (0.28) (0.28)
Rule of Law .009 .008 .008 .007 .007
(1.02) (0.94) (0.91) (0.86) (0.86)
Control of Corruption -.002 -.003 -.002 -.001 -.001
(0.30) (0.32) (0.28) (0.14) (0.14)
3 Country Characteristics Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
9 Region Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
2 Cohort Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
R
2 .69 .77 .70 .78 .70 .78 .71 .78 .71 .78
Notes:
Low Cut-Off High Cut-Off
b. Appendix table 9 gives the sample period for each country.  
c. The '3 Country Characteristics' are initial year per capita GDP, initial year investment-to-GDP ratio, and initial year human capital stock.
d. Regional fixed effects are the 9 regions that appear in table 2. Cohort fixed effects are dummies for countries entering in 1980-83 and
1985-87.
a. The country regressions are estimates of equation (8). The dependent variable is the average annual growth of real per capita GDP in 
country c.  There are 63 observations.Table 8. Testing the Robustness of the Results to the Chosen Cut-Off using U.S., South African and
Brazilian Skill Intensities.
U.S.A. S. Africa Brazil U.S.A. S. Africa Brazil
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Cut-off 4 .036 .038 .011 .018 .015 .006
(3.81) (3.90) (1.23) (3.21) (2.66) (1.28)
Cut-off 5 .031 .043 .036 .017 .015 .015
(3.36) (4.13) (3.46) (3.12) (2.76) (2.94)
Low cut-off .032 .042 .038 .018 .015 .016
(3.46) (3.92) (4.03) (3.51) (2.68) (3.57)
Cut-off 7 .029 .039 .037 .016 .017 .016
(3.12) (3.91) (3.84) (3.02) (3.58) (3.51)
Cut-off 8 .033 .030 .029 .015 .014 .014
(3.43) (2.87) (3.40) (3.23) (3.11) (3.26)
Cut-off 9 .030 .028 .027 .014 .013 .014
(3.27) (2.56) (3.20) (3.18) (2.91) (3.30)
Cut-off 10 .023 .024 .027 .012 .012 .014
(2.54) (2.42) (2.97) (2.94) (2.80) (3.07)
Cut-off 11 .021 .017 .025 .011 .010 .013
(2.53) (1.34) (2.93) (2.88) (1.71) (3.00)
High cut-off .043 .016 .020 .019 .010 .010
(4.04) (1.37) (2.41) (4.03) (1.67) (2.32)
Cut-off 13 .041 .006 .034 .019 .008 .014
(5.12) (0.63) (2.59) (4.16) (1.55) (2.49)
Notes: The industry-country regressions are estimates of equation (7). The dependent variable is the average annual growth in 
output of industry i in country c.  The country regressions are estimates of equation (8). The dependent variable is the average 
annual growth of per capita GDP in country c. 
Industry-Country Regressions Country RegressionsTable 9. Robustness Tests. Omitting Inﬂuential Observations.








Baseline .067 .032 .043 .033 .018 .019
(4.23) (3.26) (4.04) (3.66) (3.51) (4.03)
Omitting inﬂuential outliers
|ˆ ei| > 2.0 .063 .032 .040 .015 .008 .009
(4.27) (3.25) (3.74) (1.89) (2.22) (2.41)
|ˆ ei| > 1.8 .059 .034 .040 .014 .009 .011
(4.07) (3.56) (3.81) (2.05) (2.49) (2.99)
|ˆ ei| > 1.5 .060 .035 .041 .015 .010 .011
(4.28) (3.71) (3.95) (2.34) (2.89) (3.44)
|ˆ ei| > 1.0 .069 .035 .044 .017 .013 .013
(5.09) (3.62) (4.48) (2.89) (4.36) (4.32)
Notes: Every entry in the table reports a coefﬁcient and t-statistic from a
regression. The industry-country regressions are estimates of equation (7).
The dependent variable is the average annual growth in output of industry
i in country c. The country regressions are estimates of equation (8). The
dependent variable is the average annual growth of per capita GDP in
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(coef = −.003, t−stat = −1.16)
Relationship Between GDP Growth and Average Tariffs
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Partial Regression Plot
Figure 2. Partial Regression Plot: Eτc0 and Average Annual growth of Per Capita GDP.ARG ARG ARG ARG ARG ARG ARG ARG ARG ARG ARG ARG ARG ARG ARG ARG ARG
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Log Initial GDP Per Capita and Rho
Figure 3. Bivariate Relationship Between Log Initial Per Capita GDP and ρc.ARG ARG ARG ARG ARG ARG ARG ARG ARG ARG ARG ARG ARG ARG ARG ARG ARG
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Relationship Between DIFF(Low) and Democracy
Figure 4. Bivariate Relationship Between DIFFLow
c and Democracy.
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Average Absence of Corruption 1982−1995
(corr = .61)
Relationship Between DIFF(Low) and Corruption
Figure 5. Bivariate Relationship Between DIFFLow























































































































(coef = .033, t−stat = 3.66)
Partial Regression Plot: Rho























































































































(coef = .018, t−stat = 3.51)
Partial Regression Plot: DIFF(Low)
Figure 7. Partial Regression Plot: Average Annual Per Capita GDP Growth and DIFFLow
c .